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Discussion Why Most DAOs Die in Year 2 (And How to Not)

Sapien

Member

Introduction: The second-year problem​

Imagine launching a DAO today. You have a great idea, an active Discord community, a growing treasury, and members who are very excited about building something together.

Your first few months are successful. Governance proposals receive attention, contributors volunteer, and the community continues to grow.

Then things begin to change.

Members become less active. Voting participation drops. The same few people make most decisions, treasury spending becomes controversial, and contributors start questioning whether their efforts are worth it.

By the second year, the DAO may still exist on-chain, but the community that gave it life is barely functioning.

This raises an important question: why do DAOs struggle to survive beyond their initial excitement?

There is no universal research proving that most DAOs die exactly in year two. However, the second year is a useful way to describe a period when the weaknesses hidden by early excitement begin to surface.

The problem is rarely just a lack of funding or a falling token price. Often, it is a combination of poor governance, weak leadership structures, financial mistakes, and declining community participation.

Let's examine six major reasons DAOs struggle and how they can avoid them.

Voter apathy: When nobody wants to vote anymore​

One of the biggest promises of DAOs is community participation. Members can vote on proposals, influence treasury decisions, and help determine the organisation's direction.

However, having voting rights does not mean people will use them.

Initially, members are excited to participate. But as proposals become frequent, complicated, and time-consuming, interest can decline.

This is known as voter apathy.

There are three common reasons:
  • Governance fatigue: Members become tired of constantly reviewing and voting on proposals.
  • Lack of impact: People lose interest when their votes appear to make little difference.
  • Complexity: Technical proposals discourage members who cannot easily understand what they are voting on.
A DAO can have thousands of token holders but only a handful of active voters.

How to prevent it:
  1. Write proposals in simple language.
  2. Provide short summaries of important decisions.
  3. Avoid unnecessary community-wide voting.
  4. Establish predictable governance schedules.
  5. Explain what happens after successful proposals.
  6. Encourage delegation to trusted representatives.
The objective should not be merely to make everyone vote on everything. It should be to make participation meaningful.

Governance capture: When decentralisation becomes an illusion​

Governance capture happens when a small group gains disproportionate control over an organisation's decisions.

Many DAOs use token-weighted voting, meaning members with more governance tokens have greater voting power.

Although this approach can encourage investment and participation, it also creates opportunities for wealthy holders, early investors, and coordinated groups to dominate decisions.

Consider a DAO with 1,000 members where three wallets control 60% of the voting power.

Technically, the DAO has 1,000 members. Practically, three participants may determine its direction.

Research supports this concern.

In their 2023 paper, 'Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations', Ian Appel and Jillian Grennan analysed 10,639 proposals across 151 DAOs. They found that a small number of entities, often three or fewer, controlled most decisions.

How to prevent it:
  1. Monitor and publish voting-power distribution.
  2. Introduce transparent delegation systems.
  3. Consider quadratic voting for selected decisions.
  4. Establish appropriate quorum requirements.
  5. Require additional reviews for major treasury decisions.
  6. Disclose conflicts of interest.
Quadratic voting can help reduce the influence of wealthy participants, although it has limitations, including potential sybil attacks.

The important lesson is that decentralisation should be measured by the distribution of meaningful influence, not simply the number of token holders.

Treasury mismanagement: Having money is not having a strategy​

A DAO treasury provides the resources needed to fund development, pay contributors, support community initiatives, and maintain operations.

However, having a large treasury does not automatically mean a DAO is financially healthy.

Imagine a DAO that raises $5 million during a strong market cycle. It expands its team, funds several initiatives, and invests heavily in speculative assets.

But then the market changes.

Its native token loses value, revenue decreases, and operational expenses remain high.

Suddenly, the treasury cannot support its original plans.

This is why treasury management requires more than holding valuable assets.

Common mistakes include:
  • Excessive exposure to native tokens.
  • Unclear spending approval processes.
  • Poor investment decisions.
  • Unnecessary operational expenses.
  • Undocumented contributor payments.
  • Lack of financial reporting.

The Wonderland DAO controversy in January 2022 provides an important example. Its treasury manager, known as 0xSifu, was identified as Michael Patryn, a co-founder of the failed QuadrigaCX exchange.

The revelation created a major trust crisis and raised questions about transparency, due diligence, and treasury authority.

How to prevent it:


DAOs should establish written treasury policies covering:
  1. Asset allocation and risk exposure.
  2. Operational spending limits.
  3. Approval requirements for transactions.
  4. Regular financial reporting.
  5. Emergency reserves.
  6. Independent financial reviews.
A multisig wallet can improve security, but signers must also be accountable.

OlympusDAO's Treasury Framework proposal: OIP-137: is a useful example of formal treasury planning.

Its underlying principle is worth remembering: long-term growth should come from genuine demand and utility, not treasury management alone.

Mission drift: When a DAO forgets why it exists​


Mission drift happens when an organisation gradually moves away from its original purpose.

A DAO might begin with the goal of funding open-source developers. Later, it starts funding NFT projects, gaming initiatives, unrelated partnerships, and other activities.

Each decision might seem reasonable individually.

However, after several changes, members may struggle to explain what the DAO actually stands for.

This creates confusion, weakens contributor motivation, and makes treasury allocation more difficult.

People join DAOs because they believe in a particular vision. When that vision changes without proper explanation, the organisation risks losing its most committed members.

How to prevent it
:

Every DAO should have a clear mission statement explaining:
  • Why it exists.
  • Who it serves.
  • What problem it wants to solve.
  • Which activities support its objectives.
  • Which activities fall outside its scope.
Major changes to the mission should require proper community discussion and approval.

Growth is important, but growth without direction can become another form of failure.

Founder dependency: The DAO that cannot survive without its founder​

Many DAOs promote decentralisation while depending heavily on their founders for everyday operations.

The founder manages partnerships, handles community communication, resolves conflicts, guides contributors, and makes important decisions.

This arrangement may work during the early stages.

But what happens when the founder becomes inactive?

Perhaps they experience burnout, move to another project, or simply lose interest.

If nobody understands how to manage the treasury, organise operations, or maintain development, the entire organisation can become stuck.

This is founder dependency.

How to prevent it:
  1. Distribute responsibilities across independent teams.
  2. Document important operational processes.
  3. Introduce elected working groups.
  4. Establish succession plans.
  5. Encourage contributors to take ownership of initiatives.
Founders can remain valuable members without being the centre of every decision.

A healthy DAO should be able to continue operating when its founder takes a holiday.

Legal threats: Decentralisation does not mean immunity​

Another major challenge is legal and regulatory uncertainty.

DAOs may operate across several countries, manage significant funds, and interact with users subject to different legal systems.

This creates important questions.

Who is responsible when something goes wrong? Can a DAO enter enforceable contracts? Who handles taxes? Can members face personal liability?

A notable example is the legal case involving Ooki DAO and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).

In June 2023, a federal court entered a default judgment against Ooki DAO for operating an illegal trading platform.

The judgment included a $643,542 civil monetary penalty, permanent trading and registration bans, and an order requiring its website to be shut down.

The court also held that Ooki DAO could be treated as a person under the Commodity Exchange Act.

This demonstrated that operating through smart contracts does not automatically remove legal responsibility.

How to prevent it:
  1. Consider an appropriate legal structure.
  2. Document governance decisions and financial transactions.
  3. Understand applicable regulatory obligations.
  4. Establish clear contributor agreements.
  5. Seek qualified legal advice when necessary.
A legal wrapper does not guarantee immunity, but proper planning can help reduce uncertainty and protect contributors.

What previous DAO experiments teach us​

Three historical examples offer useful lessons.

Wonderland: The cost of losing community trust​

Wonderland became popular during the 2021 DeFi boom through its treasury-backed TIME token and staking incentives.

In January 2022, controversy emerged after its treasury manager, 0xSifu, was identified as Michael Patryn.

The community voted to remove him, while disagreements over whether the project should continue exposed weaknesses in its governance and leadership structure.

The lesson here is that Treasury managers need proper accountability, due diligence, and transparent oversight.

Useful reading: Wonderland governance proposal on replacing multisig control: https://nourharidy.medium.com/my-pr...lace-it-with-on-chain-governance-cc571107c2cf.


OlympusDAO: Incentives are not sustainable value​

OlympusDAO became famous for its original rebasing mechanism and high staking rewards.

However, its history demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining economic expectations built around aggressive token incentives.

Its original rebase mechanism was eventually discontinued, and the protocol evolved its governance and economic structures.

Olympus did not simply disappear; it continued developing.

Lesson here is that a DAO needs genuine utility and sustainable economics. Rewards alone cannot guarantee long-term participation.

Useful reading: OlympusDAO Treasury Framework: https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/2550-oip-137-treasury-framework.

Aragon: Sometimes the structure needs to change​

Aragon provides another interesting example of organisational restructuring.

In November 2023, the Aragon Association announced an ANT redemption initiative and a major organisational transition.

According to its November 2024 report, 87% of ANT was redeemed, with 75,093.99 ETH distributed to token holders. The remaining 11,249.01 ETH was committed to the new Aragon Foundation.

ANT no longer had a role in the project following the redemption.

This was a restructuring rather than a straightforward case of a failed DAO.

Lesson: Governance structures must evolve. Sometimes, an organisation needs to rethink its existing model instead of trying to preserve it indefinitely.

Source: Aragon ANT Redemption Initiative Report: https://blog.aragon.org/ant-redemption-initiative-report/.

Building a DAO that survives beyond year two​

The solution is not to eliminate every challenge. It is to build systems that allow the organisation to respond when challenges arise.

Here are eight practical principles:

PrincipleWhat a DAO should do
Clear purposeBuild around a real problem, not just a token launch
Accessible governanceMake proposals understandable to ordinary members
Distributed leadershipAvoid depending on one founder or small group
Financial disciplineEstablish treasury policies and spending limits
AccountabilityMake leaders and delegates answerable to members
Regular reviewsEvaluate progress against the original mission
Legal preparationUnderstand relevant laws and obligations.
Exit planningEstablish responsible restructuring or wind-down procedures.

DAOs should also measure their organisational health.

Useful indicators include active voters, contributor retention, proposal execution rates, treasury runway, voting concentration, and progress against development milestones.

For example, approving 100 proposals means little if only 20 are ever implemented.

Likewise, having 10,000 Discord members means little if only a handful contribute.

The quality of participation matters more than the appearance of activity.

Conclusion:​

Build something that can outlive its founding excitement

The second year should not be the beginning of a DAO's decline. Ideally, it should be the period when the organisation becomes more mature.

Voter apathy needs meaningful participation. Governance capture needs accountability. Treasury mismanagement needs financial discipline. Mission drift needs clear objectives. Founder dependency needs distributed leadership, while legal threats require proper planning.

None of these solutions guarantees survival. Markets change, technologies evolve, and communities sometimes lose interest.

However, DAOs that recognise these risks early have a better chance of building something sustainable.

Perhaps the biggest mistake founders make is believing that launching a DAO automatically makes it decentralised.

It doesn't.

Decentralisation must be maintained through how an organisation distributes power, manages resources, handles disagreements, and supports its contributors.

The real achievement is not building a DAO that attracts 10,000 members in its first year. It is building one that still gives those members a good reason to participate in its fifth year.

Discussion questions/food for thought:
  • Is voter apathy or governance capture the bigger threat to DAO survival?
  • Should founders retain some decision-making authority during a DAO's early years?
  • Should contributors be rewarded based on token ownership, actual contributions, or both?
  • When should a DAO accept that its original mission is no longer sustainable and consider restructuring?

​

References and further reading​

Academic research
  1. Appel & Grennan (2023): Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20231119.
  2. Fritsch, Müller & Wattenhofer (2024): Analyzing Voting Power in Decentralized Governance: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bcra.2024.100208.
  3. Han, Lee & Li (2025): A Review of DAO Governance: Recent Literature and Emerging Trends: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102734.
Historical and legal sources
  1. Wonderland governance and treasury controversy; The Block: https://www.theblock.co/news/defi/2...-sifu-and-is-considering-shutting-down-132340.
  2. OlympusDAO: Treasury Framework:https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/2550-oip-137-treasury-framework.
  3. Aragon: ANT Redemption Initiative Report: https://blog.aragon.org/ant-redemption-initiative-report/.
  4. CFTC: Ooki DAO Litigation Judgment Announcement: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8715-23.
1000923385.jpg

Note: The title is a discussion-provoking framing, not a claim that research has established a universal two-year failure rate for DAOs.
 
Last edited:

Introduction: The second-year problem​

Imagine launching a DAO today. You have a great idea, an active Discord community, a growing treasury, and members who are very excited about building something together.

Your first few months are successful. Governance proposals receive attention, contributors volunteer, and the community continues to grow.

Then things begin to change.

Members become less active. Voting participation drops. The same few people make most decisions, treasury spending becomes controversial, and contributors start questioning whether their efforts are worth it.

By the second year, the DAO may still exist on-chain, but the community that gave it life is barely functioning.

This raises an important question: why do DAOs struggle to survive beyond their initial excitement?

There is no universal research proving that most DAOs die exactly in year two. However, the second year is a useful way to describe a period when the weaknesses hidden by early excitement begin to surface.

The problem is rarely just a lack of funding or a falling token price. Often, it is a combination of poor governance, weak leadership structures, financial mistakes, and declining community participation.

Let's examine six major reasons DAOs struggle and how they can avoid them.

Voter apathy: When nobody wants to vote anymore​

One of the biggest promises of DAOs is community participation. Members can vote on proposals, influence treasury decisions, and help determine the organisation's direction.

However, having voting rights does not mean people will use them.

Initially, members are excited to participate. But as proposals become frequent, complicated, and time-consuming, interest can decline.

This is known as voter apathy.

There are three common reasons:
  • Governance fatigue: Members become tired of constantly reviewing and voting on proposals.
  • Lack of impact: People lose interest when their votes appear to make little difference.
  • Complexity: Technical proposals discourage members who cannot easily understand what they are voting on.
A DAO can have thousands of token holders but only a handful of active voters.

How to prevent it:
  1. Write proposals in simple language.
  2. Provide short summaries of important decisions.
  3. Avoid unnecessary community-wide voting.
  4. Establish predictable governance schedules.
  5. Explain what happens after successful proposals.
  6. Encourage delegation to trusted representatives.
The objective should not be merely to make everyone vote on everything. It should be to make participation meaningful.

Governance capture: When decentralisation becomes an illusion​

Governance capture happens when a small group gains disproportionate control over an organisation's decisions.

Many DAOs use token-weighted voting, meaning members with more governance tokens have greater voting power.

Although this approach can encourage investment and participation, it also creates opportunities for wealthy holders, early investors, and coordinated groups to dominate decisions.

Consider a DAO with 1,000 members where three wallets control 60% of the voting power.

Technically, the DAO has 1,000 members. Practically, three participants may determine its direction.

Research supports this concern.

In their 2023 paper, 'Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations', Ian Appel and Jillian Grennan analysed 10,639 proposals across 151 DAOs. They found that a small number of entities, often three or fewer, controlled most decisions.

How to prevent it:
  1. Monitor and publish voting-power distribution.
  2. Introduce transparent delegation systems.
  3. Consider quadratic voting for selected decisions.
  4. Establish appropriate quorum requirements.
  5. Require additional reviews for major treasury decisions.
  6. Disclose conflicts of interest.
Quadratic voting can help reduce the influence of wealthy participants, although it has limitations, including potential sybil attacks.

The important lesson is that decentralisation should be measured by the distribution of meaningful influence, not simply the number of token holders.

Treasury mismanagement: Having money is not having a strategy​

A DAO treasury provides the resources needed to fund development, pay contributors, support community initiatives, and maintain operations.

However, having a large treasury does not automatically mean a DAO is financially healthy.

Imagine a DAO that raises $5 million during a strong market cycle. It expands its team, funds several initiatives, and invests heavily in speculative assets.

But then the market changes.

Its native token loses value, revenue decreases, and operational expenses remain high.

Suddenly, the treasury cannot support its original plans.

This is why treasury management requires more than holding valuable assets.

Common mistakes include:
  • Excessive exposure to native tokens.
  • Unclear spending approval processes.
  • Poor investment decisions.
  • Unnecessary operational expenses.
  • Undocumented contributor payments.
  • Lack of financial reporting.

The Wonderland DAO controversy in January 2022 provides an important example. Its treasury manager, known as 0xSifu, was identified as Michael Patryn, a co-founder of the failed QuadrigaCX exchange.

The revelation created a major trust crisis and raised questions about transparency, due diligence, and treasury authority.

How to prevent it:

DAOs should establish written treasury policies covering:
  1. Asset allocation and risk exposure.
  2. Operational spending limits.
  3. Approval requirements for transactions.
  4. Regular financial reporting.
  5. Emergency reserves.
  6. Independent financial reviews.
A multisig wallet can improve security, but signers must also be accountable.

OlympusDAO's Treasury Framework proposal: OIP-137: is a useful example of formal treasury planning.

Its underlying principle is worth remembering: long-term growth should come from genuine demand and utility, not treasury management alone.

Mission drift: When a DAO forgets why it exists​


Mission drift happens when an organisation gradually moves away from its original purpose.

A DAO might begin with the goal of funding open-source developers. Later, it starts funding NFT projects, gaming initiatives, unrelated partnerships, and other activities.

Each decision might seem reasonable individually.

However, after several changes, members may struggle to explain what the DAO actually stands for.

This creates confusion, weakens contributor motivation, and makes treasury allocation more difficult.

People join DAOs because they believe in a particular vision. When that vision changes without proper explanation, the organisation risks losing its most committed members.

How to prevent it:

Every DAO should have a clear mission statement explaining:
  • Why it exists.
  • Who it serves.
  • What problem it wants to solve.
  • Which activities support its objectives.
  • Which activities fall outside its scope.
Major changes to the mission should require proper community discussion and approval.

Growth is important, but growth without direction can become another form of failure.

Founder dependency: The DAO that cannot survive without its founder​

Many DAOs promote decentralisation while depending heavily on their founders for everyday operations.

The founder manages partnerships, handles community communication, resolves conflicts, guides contributors, and makes important decisions.

This arrangement may work during the early stages.

But what happens when the founder becomes inactive?

Perhaps they experience burnout, move to another project, or simply lose interest.

If nobody understands how to manage the treasury, organise operations, or maintain development, the entire organisation can become stuck.

This is founder dependency.

How to prevent it:
  1. Distribute responsibilities across independent teams.
  2. Document important operational processes.
  3. Introduce elected working groups.
  4. Establish succession plans.
  5. Encourage contributors to take ownership of initiatives.
Founders can remain valuable members without being the centre of every decision.

A healthy DAO should be able to continue operating when its founder takes a holiday.

Legal threats: Decentralisation does not mean immunity​

Another major challenge is legal and regulatory uncertainty.

DAOs may operate across several countries, manage significant funds, and interact with users subject to different legal systems.

This creates important questions.

Who is responsible when something goes wrong? Can a DAO enter enforceable contracts? Who handles taxes? Can members face personal liability?

A notable example is the legal case involving Ooki DAO and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).

In June 2023, a federal court entered a default judgment against Ooki DAO for operating an illegal trading platform.

The judgment included a $643,542 civil monetary penalty, permanent trading and registration bans, and an order requiring its website to be shut down.

The court also held that Ooki DAO could be treated as a person under the Commodity Exchange Act.

This demonstrated that operating through smart contracts does not automatically remove legal responsibility.

How to prevent it:
  1. Consider an appropriate legal structure.
  2. Document governance decisions and financial transactions.
  3. Understand applicable regulatory obligations.
  4. Establish clear contributor agreements.
  5. Seek qualified legal advice when necessary.
A legal wrapper does not guarantee immunity, but proper planning can help reduce uncertainty and protect contributors.

What previous DAO experiments teach us​

Three historical examples offer useful lessons.

Wonderland: The cost of losing community trust​

Wonderland became popular during the 2021 DeFi boom through its treasury-backed TIME token and staking incentives.

In January 2022, controversy emerged after its treasury manager, 0xSifu, was identified as Michael Patryn.

The community voted to remove him, while disagreements over whether the project should continue exposed weaknesses in its governance and leadership structure.

The lesson here is that Treasury managers need proper accountability, due diligence, and transparent oversight.

Useful reading: Wonderland governance proposal on replacing multisig control: https://nourharidy.medium.com/my-pr...lace-it-with-on-chain-governance-cc571107c2cf.

OlympusDAO: Incentives are not sustainable value​

OlympusDAO became famous for its original rebasing mechanism and high staking rewards.

However, its history demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining economic expectations built around aggressive token incentives.

Its original rebase mechanism was eventually discontinued, and the protocol evolved its governance and economic structures.

Olympus did not simply disappear; it continued developing.

Lesson here is that a DAO needs genuine utility and sustainable economics. Rewards alone cannot guarantee long-term participation.

Useful reading: OlympusDAO Treasury Framework: https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/2550-oip-137-treasury-framework.

Aragon: Sometimes the structure needs to change​

Aragon provides another interesting example of organisational restructuring.

In November 2023, the Aragon Association announced an ANT redemption initiative and a major organisational transition.

According to its November 2024 report, 87% of ANT was redeemed, with 75,093.99 ETH distributed to token holders. The remaining 11,249.01 ETH was committed to the new Aragon Foundation.

ANT no longer had a role in the project following the redemption.

This was a restructuring rather than a straightforward case of a failed DAO.

Lesson: Governance structures must evolve. Sometimes, an organisation needs to rethink its existing model instead of trying to preserve it indefinitely.

Source: Aragon ANT Redemption Initiative Report: https://blog.aragon.org/ant-redemption-initiative-report/.

Building a DAO that survives beyond year two​

The solution is not to eliminate every challenge. It is to build systems that allow the organisation to respond when challenges arise.

Here are eight practical principles:

PrincipleWhat a DAO should do
Clear purposeBuild around a real problem, not just a token launch
Accessible governanceMake proposals understandable to ordinary members
Distributed leadershipAvoid depending on one founder or small group
Financial disciplineEstablish treasury policies and spending limits
AccountabilityMake leaders and delegates answerable to members
Regular reviewsEvaluate progress against the original mission
Legal preparationUnderstand relevant laws and obligations.
Exit planningEstablish responsible restructuring or wind-down procedures.

DAOs should also measure their organisational health.

Useful indicators include active voters, contributor retention, proposal execution rates, treasury runway, voting concentration, and progress against development milestones.

For example, approving 100 proposals means little if only 20 are ever implemented.

Likewise, having 10,000 Discord members means little if only a handful contribute.

The quality of participation matters more than the appearance of activity.

Conclusion:​

Build something that can outlive its founding excitement

The second year should not be the beginning of a DAO's decline. Ideally, it should be the period when the organisation becomes more mature.

Voter apathy needs meaningful participation. Governance capture needs accountability. Treasury mismanagement needs financial discipline. Mission drift needs clear objectives. Founder dependency needs distributed leadership, while legal threats require proper planning.

None of these solutions guarantees survival. Markets change, technologies evolve, and communities sometimes lose interest.

However, DAOs that recognise these risks early have a better chance of building something sustainable.

Perhaps the biggest mistake founders make is believing that launching a DAO automatically makes it decentralised.

It doesn't.

Decentralisation must be maintained through how an organisation distributes power, manages resources, handles disagreements, and supports its contributors.

The real achievement is not building a DAO that attracts 10,000 members in its first year. It is building one that still gives those members a good reason to participate in its fifth year.

Discussion questions/food for thought:
  • Is voter apathy or governance capture the bigger threat to DAO survival?
  • Should founders retain some decision-making authority during a DAO's early years?
  • Should contributors be rewarded based on token ownership, actual contributions, or both?
  • When should a DAO accept that its original mission is no longer sustainable and consider restructuring?

​

References and further reading​

Academic research
  1. Appel & Grennan (2023): Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20231119.
  2. Fritsch, Müller & Wattenhofer (2024): Analyzing Voting Power in Decentralized Governance: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bcra.2024.100208.
  3. Han, Lee & Li (2025): A Review of DAO Governance: Recent Literature and Emerging Trends: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102734.
Historical and legal sources
  1. Wonderland governance and treasury controversy; The Block: https://www.theblock.co/news/defi/2...-sifu-and-is-considering-shutting-down-132340.
  2. OlympusDAO: Treasury Framework:https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/2550-oip-137-treasury-framework.
  3. Aragon: ANT Redemption Initiative Report: https://blog.aragon.org/ant-redemption-initiative-report/.
  4. CFTC: Ooki DAO Litigation Judgment Announcement: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8715-23.
View attachment 169
Note: The title is a discussion-provoking framing, not a claim that research has established a universal two-year failure rate for DAOs.
Kindly check out my brief #4 submission @Diornov . Thanks.
 
Kindl

Introduction: The second-year problem​

Imagine launching a DAO today. You have a great idea, an active Discord community, a growing treasury, and members who are very excited about building something together.

Your first few months are successful. Governance proposals receive attention, contributors volunteer, and the community continues to grow.

Then things begin to change.

Members become less active. Voting participation drops. The same few people make most decisions, treasury spending becomes controversial, and contributors start questioning whether their efforts are worth it.

By the second year, the DAO may still exist on-chain, but the community that gave it life is barely functioning.

This raises an important question: why do DAOs struggle to survive beyond their initial excitement?

There is no universal research proving that most DAOs die exactly in year two. However, the second year is a useful way to describe a period when the weaknesses hidden by early excitement begin to surface.

The problem is rarely just a lack of funding or a falling token price. Often, it is a combination of poor governance, weak leadership structures, financial mistakes, and declining community participation.

Let's examine six major reasons DAOs struggle and how they can avoid them.

Voter apathy: When nobody wants to vote anymore​

One of the biggest promises of DAOs is community participation. Members can vote on proposals, influence treasury decisions, and help determine the organisation's direction.

However, having voting rights does not mean people will use them.

Initially, members are excited to participate. But as proposals become frequent, complicated, and time-consuming, interest can decline.

This is known as voter apathy.

There are three common reasons:
  • Governance fatigue: Members become tired of constantly reviewing and voting on proposals.
  • Lack of impact: People lose interest when their votes appear to make little difference.
  • Complexity: Technical proposals discourage members who cannot easily understand what they are voting on.
A DAO can have thousands of token holders but only a handful of active voters.

How to prevent it:
  1. Write proposals in simple language.
  2. Provide short summaries of important decisions.
  3. Avoid unnecessary community-wide voting.
  4. Establish predictable governance schedules.
  5. Explain what happens after successful proposals.
  6. Encourage delegation to trusted representatives.
The objective should not be merely to make everyone vote on everything. It should be to make participation meaningful.

Governance capture: When decentralisation becomes an illusion​

Governance capture happens when a small group gains disproportionate control over an organisation's decisions.

Many DAOs use token-weighted voting, meaning members with more governance tokens have greater voting power.

Although this approach can encourage investment and participation, it also creates opportunities for wealthy holders, early investors, and coordinated groups to dominate decisions.

Consider a DAO with 1,000 members where three wallets control 60% of the voting power.

Technically, the DAO has 1,000 members. Practically, three participants may determine its direction.

Research supports this concern.

In their 2023 paper, 'Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations', Ian Appel and Jillian Grennan analysed 10,639 proposals across 151 DAOs. They found that a small number of entities, often three or fewer, controlled most decisions.

How to prevent it:
  1. Monitor and publish voting-power distribution.
  2. Introduce transparent delegation systems.
  3. Consider quadratic voting for selected decisions.
  4. Establish appropriate quorum requirements.
  5. Require additional reviews for major treasury decisions.
  6. Disclose conflicts of interest.
Quadratic voting can help reduce the influence of wealthy participants, although it has limitations, including potential sybil attacks.

The important lesson is that decentralisation should be measured by the distribution of meaningful influence, not simply the number of token holders.

Treasury mismanagement: Having money is not having a strategy​

A DAO treasury provides the resources needed to fund development, pay contributors, support community initiatives, and maintain operations.

However, having a large treasury does not automatically mean a DAO is financially healthy.

Imagine a DAO that raises $5 million during a strong market cycle. It expands its team, funds several initiatives, and invests heavily in speculative assets.

But then the market changes.

Its native token loses value, revenue decreases, and operational expenses remain high.

Suddenly, the treasury cannot support its original plans.

This is why treasury management requires more than holding valuable assets.

Common mistakes include:
  • Excessive exposure to native tokens.
  • Unclear spending approval processes.
  • Poor investment decisions.
  • Unnecessary operational expenses.
  • Undocumented contributor payments.
  • Lack of financial reporting.

The Wonderland DAO controversy in January 2022 provides an important example. Its treasury manager, known as 0xSifu, was identified as Michael Patryn, a co-founder of the failed QuadrigaCX exchange.

The revelation created a major trust crisis and raised questions about transparency, due diligence, and treasury authority.

How to prevent it:

DAOs should establish written treasury policies covering:
  1. Asset allocation and risk exposure.
  2. Operational spending limits.
  3. Approval requirements for transactions.
  4. Regular financial reporting.
  5. Emergency reserves.
  6. Independent financial reviews.
A multisig wallet can improve security, but signers must also be accountable.

OlympusDAO's Treasury Framework proposal: OIP-137: is a useful example of formal treasury planning.

Its underlying principle is worth remembering: long-term growth should come from genuine demand and utility, not treasury management alone.

Mission drift: When a DAO forgets why it exists​


Mission drift happens when an organisation gradually moves away from its original purpose.

A DAO might begin with the goal of funding open-source developers. Later, it starts funding NFT projects, gaming initiatives, unrelated partnerships, and other activities.

Each decision might seem reasonable individually.

However, after several changes, members may struggle to explain what the DAO actually stands for.

This creates confusion, weakens contributor motivation, and makes treasury allocation more difficult.

People join DAOs because they believe in a particular vision. When that vision changes without proper explanation, the organisation risks losing its most committed members.

How to prevent it:

Every DAO should have a clear mission statement explaining:
  • Why it exists.
  • Who it serves.
  • What problem it wants to solve.
  • Which activities support its objectives.
  • Which activities fall outside its scope.
Major changes to the mission should require proper community discussion and approval.

Growth is important, but growth without direction can become another form of failure.

Founder dependency: The DAO that cannot survive without its founder​

Many DAOs promote decentralisation while depending heavily on their founders for everyday operations.

The founder manages partnerships, handles community communication, resolves conflicts, guides contributors, and makes important decisions.

This arrangement may work during the early stages.

But what happens when the founder becomes inactive?

Perhaps they experience burnout, move to another project, or simply lose interest.

If nobody understands how to manage the treasury, organise operations, or maintain development, the entire organisation can become stuck.

This is founder dependency.

How to prevent it:
  1. Distribute responsibilities across independent teams.
  2. Document important operational processes.
  3. Introduce elected working groups.
  4. Establish succession plans.
  5. Encourage contributors to take ownership of initiatives.
Founders can remain valuable members without being the centre of every decision.

A healthy DAO should be able to continue operating when its founder takes a holiday.

Legal threats: Decentralisation does not mean immunity​

Another major challenge is legal and regulatory uncertainty.

DAOs may operate across several countries, manage significant funds, and interact with users subject to different legal systems.

This creates important questions.

Who is responsible when something goes wrong? Can a DAO enter enforceable contracts? Who handles taxes? Can members face personal liability?

A notable example is the legal case involving Ooki DAO and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).

In June 2023, a federal court entered a default judgment against Ooki DAO for operating an illegal trading platform.

The judgment included a $643,542 civil monetary penalty, permanent trading and registration bans, and an order requiring its website to be shut down.

The court also held that Ooki DAO could be treated as a person under the Commodity Exchange Act.

This demonstrated that operating through smart contracts does not automatically remove legal responsibility.

How to prevent it:
  1. Consider an appropriate legal structure.
  2. Document governance decisions and financial transactions.
  3. Understand applicable regulatory obligations.
  4. Establish clear contributor agreements.
  5. Seek qualified legal advice when necessary.
A legal wrapper does not guarantee immunity, but proper planning can help reduce uncertainty and protect contributors.

What previous DAO experiments teach us​

Three historical examples offer useful lessons.

Wonderland: The cost of losing community trust​

Wonderland became popular during the 2021 DeFi boom through its treasury-backed TIME token and staking incentives.

In January 2022, controversy emerged after its treasury manager, 0xSifu, was identified as Michael Patryn.

The community voted to remove him, while disagreements over whether the project should continue exposed weaknesses in its governance and leadership structure.

The lesson here is that Treasury managers need proper accountability, due diligence, and transparent oversight.

Useful reading: Wonderland governance proposal on replacing multisig control: https://nourharidy.medium.com/my-pr...lace-it-with-on-chain-governance-cc571107c2cf.

OlympusDAO: Incentives are not sustainable value​

OlympusDAO became famous for its original rebasing mechanism and high staking rewards.

However, its history demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining economic expectations built around aggressive token incentives.

Its original rebase mechanism was eventually discontinued, and the protocol evolved its governance and economic structures.

Olympus did not simply disappear; it continued developing.

Lesson here is that a DAO needs genuine utility and sustainable economics. Rewards alone cannot guarantee long-term participation.

Useful reading: OlympusDAO Treasury Framework: https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/2550-oip-137-treasury-framework.

Aragon: Sometimes the structure needs to change​

Aragon provides another interesting example of organisational restructuring.

In November 2023, the Aragon Association announced an ANT redemption initiative and a major organisational transition.

According to its November 2024 report, 87% of ANT was redeemed, with 75,093.99 ETH distributed to token holders. The remaining 11,249.01 ETH was committed to the new Aragon Foundation.

ANT no longer had a role in the project following the redemption.

This was a restructuring rather than a straightforward case of a failed DAO.

Lesson: Governance structures must evolve. Sometimes, an organisation needs to rethink its existing model instead of trying to preserve it indefinitely.

Source: Aragon ANT Redemption Initiative Report: https://blog.aragon.org/ant-redemption-initiative-report/.

Building a DAO that survives beyond year two​

The solution is not to eliminate every challenge. It is to build systems that allow the organisation to respond when challenges arise.

Here are eight practical principles:

PrincipleWhat a DAO should do
Clear purposeBuild around a real problem, not just a token launch
Accessible governanceMake proposals understandable to ordinary members
Distributed leadershipAvoid depending on one founder or small group
Financial disciplineEstablish treasury policies and spending limits
AccountabilityMake leaders and delegates answerable to members
Regular reviewsEvaluate progress against the original mission
Legal preparationUnderstand relevant laws and obligations.
Exit planningEstablish responsible restructuring or wind-down procedures.

DAOs should also measure their organisational health.

Useful indicators include active voters, contributor retention, proposal execution rates, treasury runway, voting concentration, and progress against development milestones.

For example, approving 100 proposals means little if only 20 are ever implemented.

Likewise, having 10,000 Discord members means little if only a handful contribute.

The quality of participation matters more than the appearance of activity.

Conclusion:​

Build something that can outlive its founding excitement

The second year should not be the beginning of a DAO's decline. Ideally, it should be the period when the organisation becomes more mature.

Voter apathy needs meaningful participation. Governance capture needs accountability. Treasury mismanagement needs financial discipline. Mission drift needs clear objectives. Founder dependency needs distributed leadership, while legal threats require proper planning.

None of these solutions guarantees survival. Markets change, technologies evolve, and communities sometimes lose interest.

However, DAOs that recognise these risks early have a better chance of building something sustainable.

Perhaps the biggest mistake founders make is believing that launching a DAO automatically makes it decentralised.

It doesn't.

Decentralisation must be maintained through how an organisation distributes power, manages resources, handles disagreements, and supports its contributors.

The real achievement is not building a DAO that attracts 10,000 members in its first year. It is building one that still gives those members a good reason to participate in its fifth year.

Discussion questions/food for thought:
  • Is voter apathy or governance capture the bigger threat to DAO survival?
  • Should founders retain some decision-making authority during a DAO's early years?
  • Should contributors be rewarded based on token ownership, actual contributions, or both?
  • When should a DAO accept that its original mission is no longer sustainable and consider restructuring?

​

References and further reading​

Academic research
  1. Appel & Grennan (2023): Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20231119.
  2. Fritsch, Müller & Wattenhofer (2024): Analyzing Voting Power in Decentralized Governance: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bcra.2024.100208.
  3. Han, Lee & Li (2025): A Review of DAO Governance: Recent Literature and Emerging Trends: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102734.
Historical and legal sources
  1. Wonderland governance and treasury controversy; The Block: https://www.theblock.co/news/defi/2...-sifu-and-is-considering-shutting-down-132340.
  2. OlympusDAO: Treasury Framework:https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/2550-oip-137-treasury-framework.
  3. Aragon: ANT Redemption Initiative Report: https://blog.aragon.org/ant-redemption-initiative-report/.
  4. CFTC: Ooki DAO Litigation Judgment Announcement: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8715-23.
View attachment 169
Note: The title is a discussion-provoking framing, not a claim that research has established a universal two-year failure rate for DAOs.

Introduction: The second-year problem​

Imagine launching a DAO today. You have a great idea, an active Discord community, a growing treasury, and members who are very excited about building something together.

Your first few months are successful. Governance proposals receive attention, contributors volunteer, and the community continues to grow.

Then things begin to change.

Members become less active. Voting participation drops. The same few people make most decisions, treasury spending becomes controversial, and contributors start questioning whether their efforts are worth it.

By the second year, the DAO may still exist on-chain, but the community that gave it life is barely functioning.

This raises an important question: why do DAOs struggle to survive beyond their initial excitement?

There is no universal research proving that most DAOs die exactly in year two. However, the second year is a useful way to describe a period when the weaknesses hidden by early excitement begin to surface.

The problem is rarely just a lack of funding or a falling token price. Often, it is a combination of poor governance, weak leadership structures, financial mistakes, and declining community participation.

Let's examine six major reasons DAOs struggle and how they can avoid them.

Voter apathy: When nobody wants to vote anymore​

One of the biggest promises of DAOs is community participation. Members can vote on proposals, influence treasury decisions, and help determine the organisation's direction.

However, having voting rights does not mean people will use them.

Initially, members are excited to participate. But as proposals become frequent, complicated, and time-consuming, interest can decline.

This is known as voter apathy.

There are three common reasons:
  • Governance fatigue: Members become tired of constantly reviewing and voting on proposals.
  • Lack of impact: People lose interest when their votes appear to make little difference.
  • Complexity: Technical proposals discourage members who cannot easily understand what they are voting on.
A DAO can have thousands of token holders but only a handful of active voters.

How to prevent it:
  1. Write proposals in simple language.
  2. Provide short summaries of important decisions.
  3. Avoid unnecessary community-wide voting.
  4. Establish predictable governance schedules.
  5. Explain what happens after successful proposals.
  6. Encourage delegation to trusted representatives.
The objective should not be merely to make everyone vote on everything. It should be to make participation meaningful.

Governance capture: When decentralisation becomes an illusion​

Governance capture happens when a small group gains disproportionate control over an organisation's decisions.

Many DAOs use token-weighted voting, meaning members with more governance tokens have greater voting power.

Although this approach can encourage investment and participation, it also creates opportunities for wealthy holders, early investors, and coordinated groups to dominate decisions.

Consider a DAO with 1,000 members where three wallets control 60% of the voting power.

Technically, the DAO has 1,000 members. Practically, three participants may determine its direction.

Research supports this concern.

In their 2023 paper, 'Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations', Ian Appel and Jillian Grennan analysed 10,639 proposals across 151 DAOs. They found that a small number of entities, often three or fewer, controlled most decisions.

How to prevent it:
  1. Monitor and publish voting-power distribution.
  2. Introduce transparent delegation systems.
  3. Consider quadratic voting for selected decisions.
  4. Establish appropriate quorum requirements.
  5. Require additional reviews for major treasury decisions.
  6. Disclose conflicts of interest.
Quadratic voting can help reduce the influence of wealthy participants, although it has limitations, including potential sybil attacks.

The important lesson is that decentralisation should be measured by the distribution of meaningful influence, not simply the number of token holders.

Treasury mismanagement: Having money is not having a strategy​

A DAO treasury provides the resources needed to fund development, pay contributors, support community initiatives, and maintain operations.

However, having a large treasury does not automatically mean a DAO is financially healthy.

Imagine a DAO that raises $5 million during a strong market cycle. It expands its team, funds several initiatives, and invests heavily in speculative assets.

But then the market changes.

Its native token loses value, revenue decreases, and operational expenses remain high.

Suddenly, the treasury cannot support its original plans.

This is why treasury management requires more than holding valuable assets.

Common mistakes include:
  • Excessive exposure to native tokens.
  • Unclear spending approval processes.
  • Poor investment decisions.
  • Unnecessary operational expenses.
  • Undocumented contributor payments.
  • Lack of financial reporting.

The Wonderland DAO controversy in January 2022 provides an important example. Its treasury manager, known as 0xSifu, was identified as Michael Patryn, a co-founder of the failed QuadrigaCX exchange.

The revelation created a major trust crisis and raised questions about transparency, due diligence, and treasury authority.

How to prevent it:

DAOs should establish written treasury policies covering:
  1. Asset allocation and risk exposure.
  2. Operational spending limits.
  3. Approval requirements for transactions.
  4. Regular financial reporting.
  5. Emergency reserves.
  6. Independent financial reviews.
A multisig wallet can improve security, but signers must also be accountable.

OlympusDAO's Treasury Framework proposal: OIP-137: is a useful example of formal treasury planning.

Its underlying principle is worth remembering: long-term growth should come from genuine demand and utility, not treasury management alone.

Mission drift: When a DAO forgets why it exists​


Mission drift happens when an organisation gradually moves away from its original purpose.

A DAO might begin with the goal of funding open-source developers. Later, it starts funding NFT projects, gaming initiatives, unrelated partnerships, and other activities.

Each decision might seem reasonable individually.

However, after several changes, members may struggle to explain what the DAO actually stands for.

This creates confusion, weakens contributor motivation, and makes treasury allocation more difficult.

People join DAOs because they believe in a particular vision. When that vision changes without proper explanation, the organisation risks losing its most committed members.

How to prevent it:

Every DAO should have a clear mission statement explaining:
  • Why it exists.
  • Who it serves.
  • What problem it wants to solve.
  • Which activities support its objectives.
  • Which activities fall outside its scope.
Major changes to the mission should require proper community discussion and approval.

Growth is important, but growth without direction can become another form of failure.

Founder dependency: The DAO that cannot survive without its founder​

Many DAOs promote decentralisation while depending heavily on their founders for everyday operations.

The founder manages partnerships, handles community communication, resolves conflicts, guides contributors, and makes important decisions.

This arrangement may work during the early stages.

But what happens when the founder becomes inactive?

Perhaps they experience burnout, move to another project, or simply lose interest.

If nobody understands how to manage the treasury, organise operations, or maintain development, the entire organisation can become stuck.

This is founder dependency.

How to prevent it:
  1. Distribute responsibilities across independent teams.
  2. Document important operational processes.
  3. Introduce elected working groups.
  4. Establish succession plans.
  5. Encourage contributors to take ownership of initiatives.
Founders can remain valuable members without being the centre of every decision.

A healthy DAO should be able to continue operating when its founder takes a holiday.

Legal threats: Decentralisation does not mean immunity​

Another major challenge is legal and regulatory uncertainty.

DAOs may operate across several countries, manage significant funds, and interact with users subject to different legal systems.

This creates important questions.

Who is responsible when something goes wrong? Can a DAO enter enforceable contracts? Who handles taxes? Can members face personal liability?

A notable example is the legal case involving Ooki DAO and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).

In June 2023, a federal court entered a default judgment against Ooki DAO for operating an illegal trading platform.

The judgment included a $643,542 civil monetary penalty, permanent trading and registration bans, and an order requiring its website to be shut down.

The court also held that Ooki DAO could be treated as a person under the Commodity Exchange Act.

This demonstrated that operating through smart contracts does not automatically remove legal responsibility.

How to prevent it:
  1. Consider an appropriate legal structure.
  2. Document governance decisions and financial transactions.
  3. Understand applicable regulatory obligations.
  4. Establish clear contributor agreements.
  5. Seek qualified legal advice when necessary.
A legal wrapper does not guarantee immunity, but proper planning can help reduce uncertainty and protect contributors.

What previous DAO experiments teach us​

Three historical examples offer useful lessons.

Wonderland: The cost of losing community trust​

Wonderland became popular during the 2021 DeFi boom through its treasury-backed TIME token and staking incentives.

In January 2022, controversy emerged after its treasury manager, 0xSifu, was identified as Michael Patryn.

The community voted to remove him, while disagreements over whether the project should continue exposed weaknesses in its governance and leadership structure.

The lesson here is that Treasury managers need proper accountability, due diligence, and transparent oversight.

Useful reading: Wonderland governance proposal on replacing multisig control: https://nourharidy.medium.com/my-pr...lace-it-with-on-chain-governance-cc571107c2cf.

OlympusDAO: Incentives are not sustainable value​

OlympusDAO became famous for its original rebasing mechanism and high staking rewards.

However, its history demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining economic expectations built around aggressive token incentives.

Its original rebase mechanism was eventually discontinued, and the protocol evolved its governance and economic structures.

Olympus did not simply disappear; it continued developing.

Lesson here is that a DAO needs genuine utility and sustainable economics. Rewards alone cannot guarantee long-term participation.

Useful reading: OlympusDAO Treasury Framework: https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/2550-oip-137-treasury-framework.

Aragon: Sometimes the structure needs to change​

Aragon provides another interesting example of organisational restructuring.

In November 2023, the Aragon Association announced an ANT redemption initiative and a major organisational transition.

According to its November 2024 report, 87% of ANT was redeemed, with 75,093.99 ETH distributed to token holders. The remaining 11,249.01 ETH was committed to the new Aragon Foundation.

ANT no longer had a role in the project following the redemption.

This was a restructuring rather than a straightforward case of a failed DAO.

Lesson: Governance structures must evolve. Sometimes, an organisation needs to rethink its existing model instead of trying to preserve it indefinitely.

Source: Aragon ANT Redemption Initiative Report: https://blog.aragon.org/ant-redemption-initiative-report/.

Building a DAO that survives beyond year two​

The solution is not to eliminate every challenge. It is to build systems that allow the organisation to respond when challenges arise.

Here are eight practical principles:

PrincipleWhat a DAO should do
Clear purposeBuild around a real problem, not just a token launch
Accessible governanceMake proposals understandable to ordinary members
Distributed leadershipAvoid depending on one founder or small group
Financial disciplineEstablish treasury policies and spending limits
AccountabilityMake leaders and delegates answerable to members
Regular reviewsEvaluate progress against the original mission
Legal preparationUnderstand relevant laws and obligations.
Exit planningEstablish responsible restructuring or wind-down procedures.

DAOs should also measure their organisational health.

Useful indicators include active voters, contributor retention, proposal execution rates, treasury runway, voting concentration, and progress against development milestones.

For example, approving 100 proposals means little if only 20 are ever implemented.

Likewise, having 10,000 Discord members means little if only a handful contribute.

The quality of participation matters more than the appearance of activity.

Conclusion:​

Build something that can outlive its founding excitement

The second year should not be the beginning of a DAO's decline. Ideally, it should be the period when the organisation becomes more mature.

Voter apathy needs meaningful participation. Governance capture needs accountability. Treasury mismanagement needs financial discipline. Mission drift needs clear objectives. Founder dependency needs distributed leadership, while legal threats require proper planning.

None of these solutions guarantees survival. Markets change, technologies evolve, and communities sometimes lose interest.

However, DAOs that recognise these risks early have a better chance of building something sustainable.

Perhaps the biggest mistake founders make is believing that launching a DAO automatically makes it decentralised.

It doesn't.

Decentralisation must be maintained through how an organisation distributes power, manages resources, handles disagreements, and supports its contributors.

The real achievement is not building a DAO that attracts 10,000 members in its first year. It is building one that still gives those members a good reason to participate in its fifth year.

Discussion questions/food for thought:
  • Is voter apathy or governance capture the bigger threat to DAO survival?
  • Should founders retain some decision-making authority during a DAO's early years?
  • Should contributors be rewarded based on token ownership, actual contributions, or both?
  • When should a DAO accept that its original mission is no longer sustainable and consider restructuring?

​

References and further reading​

Academic research
  1. Appel & Grennan (2023): Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20231119.
  2. Fritsch, Müller & Wattenhofer (2024): Analyzing Voting Power in Decentralized Governance: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bcra.2024.100208.
  3. Han, Lee & Li (2025): A Review of DAO Governance: Recent Literature and Emerging Trends: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102734.
Historical and legal sources
  1. Wonderland governance and treasury controversy; The Block: https://www.theblock.co/news/defi/2...-sifu-and-is-considering-shutting-down-132340.
  2. OlympusDAO: Treasury Framework:https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/2550-oip-137-treasury-framework.
  3. Aragon: ANT Redemption Initiative Report: https://blog.aragon.org/ant-redemption-initiative-report/.
  4. CFTC: Ooki DAO Litigation Judgment Announcement: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8715-23.
View attachment 169
Note: The title is a discussion-provoking framing, not a claim that research has established a universal two-year failure rate for DAOs.
Kindly check out brief #4 submission @PrinceSupreme
 
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